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本文摘要:In late 2004, U.S. manufacturer Motorola scored a world-wide hit with its thin Razr flip-phones. Nokia weathered criticism from investors that it was expending too much effort on high-end smartphones while its rival ate into its lucrative


In late 2004, U.S. manufacturer Motorola scored a world-wide hit with its thin Razr flip-phones. Nokia weathered criticism from investors that it was expending too much effort on high-end smartphones while its rival ate into its lucrative business selling expensive dumb phones to upwardly mobile people around the world. 2004年底,美国制造商摩托罗拉(Motorola)凭藉其轻巧的Razr掀盖式手机在世界上一炮打响。诺基亚遭了投资者的抨击。

他们说道,在竞争对手风化其极为赚的业务、向全球社会经济地位大大提升的用户销售便宜的“傻瓜”手机时,诺基亚却在高端智能手机上花费了过于多的精力。After Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo, Nokias former chief financial officer, took the helm from Mr. Ollila in 2006, he merged Nokias smartphone and basic-phone operations. The result, said several former executives, was that the more profitable basic phone business started calling the shots. 2006年诺基亚前首席财务宽康培凯(Olli-Pekka Kallasvuo)接任奥利拉兼任首席执行长,之后他将诺基亚的智能手机和功能手机业务合二为一。该公司数位前低管说道,结果就导致更加盈利的功能手机业务开始左右整体业务的发展。The Nokia bias went backwards, said Jari Pasanen, a member of a group Nokia set up in 2004 to create multimedia services for smartphones and now a venture capitalist in Finland. It went toward traditional mobile phones. 诺基亚2004年成立了一个为智能手机创立多媒体服务的集团。

该集团成员帕萨宁(Jari Pasanen)说道,诺基亚的侧重点衰退回来了,它南北了传统手机。帕萨宁目前是芬兰的一名风险投资家。

Nokias smartphones had hit the market too early, before consumers or wireless networks were ready to make use of them. And when the iPhone emerged, Nokia failed to recognize the threat. 诺基亚智能手机的面市太超前了,当时消费者和无线网络还没作好采纳智能手机的打算。此外,当iPhone经常出现时,诺基亚没认识到它所带给的威胁。Nokia engineers tear-down reports, according to people who saw them, emphasized that the iPhone was expensive to manufacture and only worked on second-generation networks-primitive compared with Nokias 3G technology. One report noted that the iPhone didnt come close to passing Nokias rigorous drop test, in which a phone is dropped five feet onto concrete from a variety of angles. 据看完诺基亚工程师的“指责”报告的人说道,报告中特别强调,iPhone生产成本高,不能用作第二代网络,这与诺基亚的3G技术比起过于完整了。

有一份报告说道,iPhone距离需要通过诺基亚严苛的“掉下来测试”还差得远。在这个测试中,手机必须从五英尺高的高度以有所不同角度掉下来到水泥地面上。Yet consumers loved the iPhone, and by 2008 Nokia executives had realized that matching Apples slick operating system amounted to their biggest challenge. 然而,消费者对iPhone爱不释手。到2008年时,诺基亚高管们早已意识到,要与苹果美妙绝伦的操作系统媲美是他们的仅次于挑战。

One team tried to revamp Symbian, the aging operating system that ran most Nokia smartphones. Another effort, eventually dubbed MeeGo, tried to build a new system from the ground up. 一个研发团队企图改建诺基亚大多数智能手机所用于的老旧的塞班(Symbian)系统,而另一个团队则企图从头开始打造出一个取名为MeeGo的全新操作系统。People involved with both efforts say the two teams competed with each other for support within the company and the attention of top executives-a problem that plagued Nokias RD operations. 据曾多次在两个研发团队工作过的人说道,在谋求公司内部反对以及高层注目等问题上两支团队相互竞争,这一问题后遗症着诺基亚的研发业务。You were spending more time fighting politics than doing design, said Alastair Curtis, Nokias chief designer from 2006 to 2009. The organizational structure was so convoluted, he added, that it was hard for the team to drive through a coherent, consistent, beautiful experience. 在2006年至2009年兼任诺基亚首席设计师的柯蒂斯(Alastair Curtis)说道,他们花上在政治斗争上的时间比花在设计上的时间多。

柯蒂斯还说道,诺基亚的的组织结构错综复杂,想已完成一个连贯、完全一致且动人的研发过程对研发团队来说很难。In 2010, for instance, Nokia was hashing out some details of software that would make it easier for outside programmers to write applications that could work on any Nokia smartphone. 例如在2010年,诺基亚开会工程师企图定案一款软件的某些细节。这款软件能让外部程序员更为便利地续写需要在任何一款诺基亚智能手机上运营的应用程序。

At some companies, such decisions might be made around a conference table. In Nokias case, the meeting involved gathering about 100 engineers and product managers from offices as far-flung as Massachusetts and China in a hotel ballroom in Mainz, Germany, two people who attended the meeting recall. 在一些公司,有可能只要在会议桌旁进个会就能作出此类要求。但据两位参会人员回想,诺基亚却将约100名工程师和产品经理开会到德国美因茨一家酒店的宴会厅内召开,他们中一些人甚至就是指美国马萨诸塞州和中国远道而来的。Over three days, the Nokia employees sat on folding chairs and jotted notes on an array of paper easels. Representatives of MeeGo, Symbian and other programs within Nokia all struggled to make themselves heard. 在三天的时间里,诺基亚员工躺在折叠椅上录着笔记。MeeGo、塞班以及诺基亚内部其它项目组都在希望收到自己的声音。

People were trying to keep their jobs, one person there recalls. Each group was accountable for delivering the most competitive phone. 一位与会者回想,大家都企图挽回自己的饭碗。每个团队都有责任拿走最不具竞争力的手机。

Key business partners were frustrated as well. Shortly after Apple began selling the iPhone in June 2007, chip supplier Qualcomm Corp. QCOM +2.92% settled a long running patent battle with Nokia and began collaborating on projects. 诺基亚的关键业务合作伙伴也深感十分失望。在苹果于2007年6月开始销售iPhone后旋即,芯片供应商高通公司(Qualcomm Corp.)和诺基亚就一场专利消耗战达成协议妥协,双方开始在项目上进行合作。What struck me when we started working with Nokia back in 2008 was how Nokia spent much more time than other device makers just strategizing, Qualcomm Chief Executive Paul Jacobs said. We would present Nokia with a new technology that to us would seem as a big opportunity. Instead of just diving into this opportunity, Nokia would spend a long time, maybe six to nine months, just assessing the opportunity. And by that time the opportunity often just went away. 高通公司首席执行长雅各布(Paul Jacobs)说道,2008年我们开始和诺基亚进行合作的时候,给我留给深刻印象的是,和其它设备制造商比起,诺基亚花上在制订战略上的时间要非常少。有时我们不会给诺基亚获取一项新技术,在我们显然,这可能会是一个极大商机。

不过诺基亚不是立刻开始利用这个机会,而是花上很长时间(有可能要六到九个月)来评估这个机会。等到他们评估好了时,机会往往已从手中丢下了。When Mr. Elop took over as CEO in 2010 Nokia was spending 5 billion a year on RD-30% of the mobile phone industrys total, according to Bernstein research. Yet it remained far from launching a legitimate competitor to the iPhone. 研究机构Bernstein research的数据指出,埃洛普2010年兼任CEO的时候,诺基亚每年的研发费用高达50亿欧元,这一数字占到手机产业研发总经费的30%。但诺基亚一直没发售一个不足以和iPhone相匹敌的机型。


Before the latest round of cuts, he said, the company was still struggling to focus on useful RD. Mr. Elop has sifted through data and visited labs around the world to personally terminate projects that werent core priorities-like one to help buyers in India link their phones to new government identification numbers. 雅各布说道,在最近这轮削减成本之前,诺基亚依然没能很好地把精力集中于到简单的研发项目上。埃洛普细心审查数据,造访坐落于全球各地的实验室,特地中止那些非重点项目,比如一个可以将印度用户的手机同新发布的政府身份识别码联系在一起的工具。

Mr. Elop is refocusing around services like location and mapping, which came with the companys $8 billion 2008 acquisition of Navteq. 埃洛普新的将业务焦点放在定位和地图服务上。诺基亚2008年花80亿美元并购Navteq之后取得了其定位和地图业务。

But he is having trouble rolling out products that catch on with consumers. Nokias latest phone, the Lumia, has been well reviewed, but sales may suffer as consumers hold out for the next version of Microsofts software, due later this year. 但在发售不受消费者青睐的产品一事上埃洛普遇到了困难。诺基亚新出的手机Lumia虽不受赞誉,但由于消费者在微软公司下一代操作系统软件今年晚些时候发售前不愿出售这款手机,Lumia的销量可能会受到影响。Jo Harlow, whom Mr. Elop appointed head of smartphones shortly after he became CEO, said Nokia will launch lower-priced Lumia devices in the coming months to better compete with aggressive Asian device makers such as Chinas Huawei Technologies. Ms. Harlow said the company is also very interested in entering the tablet market. 埃洛普沦为CEO之后旋即任命的智能手机业务主管哈洛(Jo Harlow)说道,诺基亚将在未来几个月内发售低价Lumia手机,以便更佳地同中国的华为技术有限公司(Huawei Technologies)等雄心勃勃的亚洲手机厂商竞争。

哈洛还说道,诺基亚也对转入平板电脑市场“十分感兴趣”。Mr. Elop has shaken up a sales and marketing department, replacing Chief Operating Officer Jerri DeVard and two other executives after the Lumia launch. In June, Mr. Elop picked Chris Weber, a 47-year-old former Microsoft colleague who had been running Nokias North American effort, to take over. Ms. DeVard couldnt be reached for comment. 埃洛普对销售和营销部展开了一次相当大的人事调整。在发售Lumia手机之后,埃洛普换成了首席运营长德瓦德(Jerri DeVard)和另外两名高管。

今年6月,埃洛普挑中他在微软公司时的同事、现年47岁的韦伯(Chris Weber)接掌德瓦德的工作。记者无法联系德瓦德置评。Nokia still is struggling to turn its good ideas into products. The first half of the year saw Nokia book more patents than in any six-month period since 2007, Mr. Elop said, leaving Nokia with more than 30,000 in all. Some might be sold to raise cash, he said. 诺基亚在将较好创新改变为产品方面仍然展现出得不尽如人意。


We may decide there could be elements of it that could be sold off, turned into more immediate cash for us-which is something that is important when youre going through a turnaround, Mr. Elop said. 埃洛普说道,我们可能会要求出售部分专利,以筹措我们更加急需的现金。当企业处在扭亏为盈阶段时,现金很最重要。